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COMMENTS
PARENT-CHILD WIRETAPPING: IS TITLE III
ENOUGH?
Deana A. Labriola
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968'
(the Act) prohibits the interception of any wire, oral, or electronic com-
munication by any person.2 Many states have also enacted similar laws
prohibiting this conduct.3 Under Title III, a party is subject to both
criminal and civil liability if found to have violated the Act.
+J.D. Candidate, May 2001, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law.
1. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-25 (1994).
2. See id. § 2511(1)(a) (making it unlawful to intercept communications of another
person). Among other things, the Act has come to protect citizens from having their tele-
phone conversations wiretapped. Title III provides in relevant part:
(1) Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter any person who-
(a) intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other
person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic com-
munication... shall be punished as provided in subsection (4) or shall be subject
to suit as provided in subsection (5).
Id.
3. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 13A-11-31, 13A-11-33, 13A-11-35 (1994 & Supp. 1999)
(making it a crime to use any device with the intent to eavesdrop, which mirrors the fed-
eral Act); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/14-1 to 14-9 (West 1993 & Supp. 2000) (including
exemptions, liabilities, and definitions, just as the federal Act does); see also Steve Leben,
Evidence for the Family Lawyer: Intrafamily Wiretapping, the Fifth Amendment and Other
Selected Topics, 68 J. KAN. B.A. 24, 26-27 (1999) (providing that the admissibility of evi-
dence in lawsuits for wiretapping cases will depend on whether a person violated the fed-
eral statute or a state statute, or both).
4. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(4)(a), (b)(i) (establishing criminal liability for violating the
Act). Title III provides that: "(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this subsection
or in subsection (5), whoever violates subsection (1) of this section shall be fined under
this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both." Id. § 2511(4). Title III author-
izes the recovery of civil damages, providing in relevant part:
(a) In General. -Except as provided in section 2511(2)(a)(ii), any person whose
wire, oral, or electronic communication is intercepted, disclosed or intentionally
used in violation of this chapter may in a civil action recover from the person or
entity which engaged in that violation such relief as may be appropriate.
(b) Relief.-In an action under this section, appropriate relief includes-
(1) such preliminary and other equitable or declaratory relief as may be
appropriate;
(2) damages under subsection (c) and punitive damages in appropriate
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Congress enacted Title III to combat organized crime. Even with this
goal in mind, however, Congress provided two exceptions to liability un-
der the Act.6 A party may not be liable if his or her conduct falls under
the "extension telephone" exception' or the "consent" exception.8
Although the language of Title III fails to include a specific "domestic
relations" exception, many courts have interpreted the Act to include
such an exception.9 Courts have used the Act's legislative history, rather
cases; and
(3) a reasonable attorney's fee and other litigation costs reasonably in-
curred.
Id. §2520(a)-(b).
5. See S. REP. No. 90-1097, at 70 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2157;
see also CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN & ANNE T. MCKENNA, WIRETAPPING AND
EAVESDROPPING § 1.6 (2d ed. 1995) (noting that Title III was enacted to combat crime
and safeguard the privacy of wire and oral communications). Compare United States v.
Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 508 (1974) (suppressing evidence of a wiretap obtained on a well-
known drug trafficker because the police lacked proper authorization to obtain the wire-
tap), with United States v. Fairchild, 189 F.3d 769, 774-75 (8th Cir. 1999) (finding sufficient
probable cause that defendant was involved in racketeering and drug trafficking to permit
the wiretapping of his phone under Title III). These two cases illustrate the use of Title III
to combat organized crime by using the statute to indict drug traffickers on RICO charges.
6. See David J. Anderman, Comment, Title III at a Crossroads: The Ordinary
Course of Business in the Home, the Consent of Children, and Parental Wiretapping, 141 U.
PA. L. REV. 2261, 2274, 2288 (1993) (recognizing that courts use the extension telephone
exception and one-party consent exception to exempt certain situations from liability un-
der the Act).
7. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5)(a) (1994). Title III provides, in relevant part:
(5) "electronic, mechanical or other device" means any device or apparatus
which can be used to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication other
than-
(a) any telephone or telegraph instrument, equipment or facility, or any
component thereof, (i) furnished to the subscriber or user by a provider of
wire or electronic communication service in the ordinary course of its busi-
ness and being used by the subscriber or user in the ordinary course of its
business or furnished by such subscriber or user for connection to the facili-
ties of such service and used in the ordinary course of its business[.]
Id. The extension telephone exception is based on § 2510(5)(a)(i), which excludes from
liability under the Act those interceptions obtained by a subscriber or user "in the ordi-
nary course of its business." Hon. Robert L. Gottsfield, Hey, Honey, Let's Tape the Kids,
ARIz. ATT'Y, Nov. 1998, at 33.
8. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) (1994). Title III provides:
It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person not acting under color of
law to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication where such person is a
party to the communication or where one of the parties to the communication
has given prior consent to such interception unless such communication is inter-
cepted for the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act in violation of
the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any State.
Id.
9. See Anderman, supra note 6, at 2271-72 (noting that whileTitle III does not refer-
ence a domestic relations exception). Many courts have been unwilling to apply Title III's
[Vol. 50:429
2001] Parent-Child Wiretapping: Is Title III Enough?
than the language of Title III itself, to fashion a domestic relations excep-
tion in order to exempt a spouse or family member from liability for
wiretapping another spouse or family member. ° The broad domestic
relation exception includes two specific exceptions that courts use to ex-
empt spouses or family members from liability under the Act." These
exceptions are known as the "interspousal" exception and the "parent-
child" exception."
Since the Act's inception, a number of cases have debated the exis-
tence of an interspousal exception under the Act. 3 Some of these cases
question the existence of a Title III exception when one spouse inter-
cepts the telephone calls or conversations of another.14 Some circuits
claim that an interspousal exception to Title III exists because domestic
relations cases present issues within state control, and the federal Act
does not stretch far enough to include domestic relations." Other circuits
disagree, however, holding that Title III does not specifically delineate
an exemption for domestic relations cases." In these jurisdictions, a
broad prohibitions to wiretapping within the home) See id. at 2262.
10. See Jonathan D. Niemeyer, Note, All in the Family: Interspousal and Parental
Wiretapping Under Title III of the Omnibus Crime Act, 81 KY. L.J. 237, 243 (1992-1993)
(claiming that a domestic relations exception exists under Title III because Congress never
"intended to meddle in domestic relations" with the passage of Title III).
11. See Anonymous v. Anonymous, 558 F.2d 677, 679 (2d Cir. 1977) (acknowledging
a parent-child exception within the Act); Simpson v. Simpson, 490 F.2d 803, 810 (5th Cir.
1974) (holding that an interspousal exception exists under the Act to exempt spouses from
wiretapping each other); see generally Anderman, supra note 6, at 2262-67 (citing the use
by some courts of the interspousal and parent-child exceptions).
12. Leben, supra note 3, at 26-27 (describing interspousal and parent-child telephone
interceptions as the two situations that may be considered under the federal statutes).
13. Compare Simpson, 490 F.2d at 810 (finding an interspousal exception), and
Rushing v. Rushing, 724 So.2d 911, 915 (Miss. 1998) (same), with Heggy v. Heggy, 944
F.2d 1537, 1541 (10th Cir. 1991) (finding no interspousal exception), and Pritchard v. Prit-
chard, 732 F.2d 372, 374 (4th Cir. 1984) (same), and United States v. Jones, 542 F.2d 661,
668-69 (6th Cir. 1976) (same); see generally Niemeyer, supra note 10, at 239 (indicating
that the circuits are still debating the issue of interspousal wiretapping under Title III).
14. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
15. See, e.g., Simpson, 490 F.2d at 805 (asserting that Congress did not intend for Title
III to extend into the marital home because it is an area generally left to the states);
Anonymous, 558 F.2d at 679 (using Simpson to determine that parent-child wiretapping is
exempt from liability under the Act); see also Anderman, supra note 6, at 2264-65 (empha-
sizing that a number of courts have used the reasoning from Simpson to find a parent-child
exception).
16. See, e.g., Heggy, 944 F.2d at 1539-40 (using the Act's clear and unambiguous lan-
guage to determine that no exception for domestic relations exists under the Act); Prit-
chard, 732 F.2d at 374 (reaffirming that the Act does not include an exception for inter-
spousal wiretapping scenarios); Jones, 542 F.2d at 668-69 (explaining that Congress
intended for liability under Title III to reach all areas of electronic surveillance, including
cases between spouses).
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spouse can be held accountable for violating the Act.17
Only recently, however, has a new issue arisen: whether one parent has
the right to intercept his or her child's telephone conversations with the
other parent. 8 These cases generally address this issue in the context of
divorce or custody disputes. 9 In these domestic relations cases, courts
generally have interpreted Title III in conjunction with evidentiary rul-
ings to determine whether tape recordings between a parent and child
are admissible in custody disputes .2  This is no small task, since most of
the recorded conversations would provide crucial evidence about the
parent-child relationship, thereby making it easier for a judge to decide
which parent is best suited to have custody of the child.2'
Many courts have had to reevaluate their approach to interpreting Ti-
tle III because of the nature of the parent-child relationship.22 Special
concerns arise in such cases because one of the parties is a minor, and the
future of familial relationships is at stake. Although domestic conflicts
are generally a state issue, many federal courts have been forced to
tackle such issues directly when dealing with potential violations of Title
111.23
17. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(4) (1994) (permitting criminal punishment for violating the
Act); id. § 2520 (allowing for the recovery of civil damages for violating the Act); see also
Jones, 542 F.2d at 670 (ruling that Congress enacted Title III to protect the privacy of tele-
phone users from all persons, including third parties or spouses).
18. See generally FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 5, §§ 7.12, 7.16 (recognizing the
number of court cases that have raised the issue of a parent's authority to consent to the
interception of the child's conversations).
19. See Anderman, supra note 6, at 2291 (stating that only one case involving parent-
child wiretapping has not involved a couple that is divorced or pending divorce); Cori D.
Stephens, Note, All's Fair. No Remedy Under Title III for Interspousal Surveillance, 57
FORDHAM L. REV. 1035, 1048 (1988) ("Courts recognize that the act of surveillance is
really an extension of a domestic dispute. Since interspousal surveillance is rooted in a
domestic dispute, the act occurs in the course of family activity").
20. Cf., Richard I. Zuber, Domestic Eavesdropping and Wiretapping: Admissibility of
Intercepted Communications, 21 COLO. LAW. 455, 458 (1992) (describing the admissibility
and inadmissibility requirements of the contents of a wiretapped recording and any other
evidence derived therefrom into evidence at a trial).
21. See Gottsfield, supra note 7, at 33 (claiming that tape-recorded evidence admitted
at custody hearings may be the best evidence to demonstrate which parent should have
custody).
22. See Anderman, supra note 6, at 2303 (noting that the parent-child relationship is a
delicate one). Further, a function of the law is to keep that relationship intact. See id. at
2304. Therefore, a parent is presumed to have to act in the best interests of his or her
child, because the child is unable to do so himself. See id. at 2290-91. The Supreme Court
has even recognized a parent's right and duty to prepare his or her child for obligations
such as the instillation of moral standards, religious beliefs, and the components of good
citizenship. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972).
23. See Elizabeth Williams, Annotation, Applicability, in Civil Action, of Provisions
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This Comment addresses Title III's broad scope and its evolution
through judicial interpretation. First, this Comment explores the excep-
tions in Title III, namely the telephone extension exception and the con-
sent exception. This Comment then considers judicial interpretations of
Title III, focusing on the statute's express language and legislative his-
tory. Next, this Comment analyzes the consent exception specifically and
the various reasons for treating this exception differently. Finally, this
Comment argues for a consent age of eighteen and inclusion of a good
faith requirement to the vicarious consent exception. In support of this
recommendation, this Comment further argues that Congress, not the
judiciary, is best suited to make these determinations by amending Title
III.
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF TITLE III: Two EXCEPTIONS OR
MORE
Title III makes it illegal for any person to "intentionally intercept, en-
deavor to intercept, or procure any other person to intercept or endeavor
to intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic communication. ,24 There are,
however, two exceptions to Title III: the extension telephone exception
and the consent exception.25 Moreover, no part of Title III's language
21
specifically grants an exception for domestic relations cases.
The "extension telephone" exception is drawn from 18 U.S.C. §
2510(5)(a)(i).27 Essentially, this exception involves a scenario in which a
person picks up another telephone extension in the house while someone
else is on the line.28 It is not a violation of Title III to pick up an exten-
sion in the home and listen to another person's conversation; that type of
interception is not intentional, as required by Title 111.29 Also, the exten-
of Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Prohibiting Interception of Com-
munications (18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)), to Interceptions by Spouse, or Spouse's Agent, of Con-
versations of Other Spouse, 139 A.L.R. FED. 517, 526-27 (1997) (noting that federal courts
must still decide civil actions based on claims of interspousal wiretapping under Title III,
even if a criminal charge against one of the parties is pending in state court).
24. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) (1994).
25. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text (giving the statutory language of both
exceptions).
26. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-25 (1994); see also Niemeyer, supra note 10, at 237 (claim-
ing that the language of the Act includes all individuals, unless otherwise exempted).
27. Gottsfield, supra note 7, at 33.
28. See, e.g., Barbara Amiel, Privacy Is Not the Exclusive Right of the Great and
Good, THE TIMES OF LONDON, Jan. 17, 1993 (noting that Germany prohibits installation
in private households of extension telephones that would enable family members to
eavesdrop on the main line).
29. See Anderman, supra note 6, at 2276. It is not unusual that other family members
accidentally and unintentionally overhear some conversations through an extension tele-
2001]
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sion telephone exception excludes from liability those interceptions by a
subscriber that occur in the ordinary course of business. Case law indi-
cates that recording conversations in one's own home on an extension
telephone is within a user's ordinary course of business, and therefore
does not violate Title 11I.31
The "consent" exception is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d).32 The
consent exception makes it lawful to intercept a communication when at
least one party to the communication consents to the interception.33
From the consent exception in Title III, courts have formulated the doc-
trine of vicarious consent." The vicarious consent doctrine permits one
phone in the home. See id. Intrusions of this nature are not punishable under Title III
because liability under Title III requires the act to be intentional. See 18 U.S.C. §
2511(1)(a)-(b). A 1986 amendment lowered the level of intent required to violate Title III
from "willful" to "intentional." Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L.
No. 99-508, § 101(f)(1), 100 Stat. 1848, 1853.
30. See Leben, supra note 3, at 26 (recognizing that the federal statute exempts from
liability under the Act those "interceptions that occur via telephone instruments to a sub-
scriber by the phone company when used in the ordinary course of business"). Intercep-
tions within the home are described as ordinary because they are usually accidental, and
therefore do not fulfill the Title III requirement that interceptions be intentional. See An-
derman, supra note 6, at 2276; see, e.g., Anonymous v. Anonymous, 558 F.2d 677, 678-79
(2d Cir. 1977) (noting that listening in on an extension telephone in a home would cer-
tainly be in the "'ordinary course of [the user's] business'). BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
defines "ordinary course of business" as "[t]he transaction of business according to the
common usages and customs of the commercial world generally or of the particular com-
munity or (in some cases) of the particular individual whose acts are under consideration."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1098 (6th ed. 1990). More generally, business is defined as
"[t]hat which habitually busies or occupies or engages the time, attention, labor, and effort
of persons as a principal serious concern or interest .... Id. at 198; see also infra note 31
and accompanying text (showing some courts' interpretation of the ordinary course of
business standard). But see Watkins v. L.M. Berry & Co., 704 F.2d 577, 583 (11th Cir.
1983) (holding that a personal call cannot be intercepted under the ordinary course of
business exception, except for those interceptions necessary to determine if a call is per-
sonal or not). This limitation only allows the interception in the ordinary course of busi-
ness to determine the nature of the call, not the content. See id.; see also supra note 7 and
accompanying text (showing how the ordinary course of business arises out of the exten-
sion telephone exception).
31. See, e.g., Newcomb v. Ingle, 944 F.2d 1534, 1536 (10th Cir. 1991) (expanding to
homes the exemption to Title III by claiming that Congress would not give an exception to
businesses that it would not intend to give to private homes); Anonymous, 558 F.2d at 678-
79 (admitting that the use of an extension telephone in the appellee's home falls under a
user's ordinary course of business as stated in the Act).
32. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (providing the statutory language for the
consent exception).
33. See id.
34. See, e.g., Campbell v. Price, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1186, 1189 (E.D. Ark. 1998) (using the
consent exception to allow vicarious consent); Thompson v. Dulaney, 838 F. Supp. 1535,
1544-45 (D. Utah 1993) (basing the decision to allow vicarious consent on the consent ex-
ception of the Act found in 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d)). The Thompson court required a good
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parent to consent on a child's behalf to the taping of the child's tele-
phone conversations with the other parent.35 Some courts have allowed
vicarious consent by the parent because children do not have the legal
capacity to consent for themselves.36 Moreover, many courts have recog-
nized a growing need for the vicarious consent exception in order to pro-
tect a child's welfare.37
Title III has divided many courts, however, because it does not specifi-
cally include a domestic relations exception.3" Some courts look no fur-
ther than the language of the Act itself when deciding whether a domes-
tic relations exception exists." These courts argue that since there is no
faith, objectively reasonable purpose by a parent to consent to the taping of conversations
of a minor child. See id. Some courts have adopted this standard for vicarious consent.
See id.
35. See Gottsfield, supra note 7, at 33 (explaining that the vicarious consent exception
is premised on § 2511(2)(d) of the Act, which is the consent exception, to exclude parents
from liability).
36. See, e.g., Thompson, 838 F. Supp. at 1544; Silas v. Silas, 680 So. 2d 368, 371 (Ala.
Civ. App. 1996). Black's Law Dictionary defines "capacity" as a "legal qualification, such
as legal age, that determines one's ability to sue or be sued, to enter into a binding con-
tract, and the like." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 199 (7th ed. 1999). "Capacity" is further
defined as the "mental ability to understand the nature and effects of one's acts." Id. Ca-
pacity has been a source of debate in regard to juvenile offenders. See generally Donald L.
Beschle, The Juvenile Justice Counterrevolution: Responding to Cognitive Dissonance in
the Law's View of the Decision-Making Capacity of Minors, 48 EMORY L.J. 65, 67 (1999)
(noting that minors are considered to have less than full capacity, which makes them less
than fully culpable for the crimes they commit).
37. See Anderman, supra note 6, at 2266. Anderman notes:
In order to determine whether such an intrusion is justified, the law often man-
dates an inquiry into whether the "best interests" of a child will be served by
governmental involvement. Under this standard, the argument for exempting
parental wiretapping from the prohibitions of Title III is persuasive only if one
assumes that parents act in the best interests of their children when they eaves-
drop on their conversations.
Id. A parent's responsibility to serve the child's best interests, however, often competes
with a person's-here the child's-right to privacy, which does not allow for the child's
telephone conversations to be tapped. Cf. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-51
(1967) (concluding that the government's eavesdropping activities violated the petitioner's
right to privacy); James W. Hilliard, A Familiar Tort That May Not Exist in Illinois: The
Unreasonable Intrusion on Another's Seclusion, 30 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 601, 606 (1999) (dis-
cussing that the right of privacy is not explicitly set forth in the United States Constitution,
but is inherent in many of the amendments). The existence of substantive due process, as
interpreted from the Due Process Clause, has also been the source by which personal
freedoms are protected from governmental interference. See WILLIAM A. KAPLIN, THE
CONCEPTS AND METHODS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 140 (1992). Privacy rights are es-
pecially protected under this analysis. See id.
38. See supra note 13 and accompanying text; see also Williams, supra note 23, at 526
(finding that the circuits are split on whether Title III reaches into the realm of domestic
relations to address cases of interspousal wiretapping).
39. See, e.g., Kempf v. Kempf, 868 F.2d 970, 973 (8th Cir. 1989) (agreeing with the
20011
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mention of a domestic relations exception, one does not exist.4" Further,
if a statute's language is clear and unambiguous, and that language con-
veys Congress's intent, the language controls.4'
Other courts, however, have construed the Act to include a domestic
relations exception based on the Act's legislative history. Courts look-
ing to the legislative history have found some evidence that liability un-
der the Act does not include domestic relation cases.43 Therefore, these
courts have held that a spouse or family member is not liable under the
Act.44 The testimony of Professor Herman Schwartz at a Senate hearing
on wire interception and eavesdropping is one example of the evidence
that courts have relied upon to articulate the domestic relations excep-
tion to the Act.45 Professor Schwartz argued that "there may be cases
holding of Pritchard v. Pritchard, 732 F.2d 372 (4th Cir. 1984), and adhering to the Act's
language); Pritchard v. Pritchard, 732 F.2d 372, 374 (4th Cir. 1984) (refusing to allow a
domestic relations exception because the language of the Act is clear and unambiguous);
United States v. Jones, 542 F.2d 661, 668 (6th Cir. 1976) (asserting that the Simpson court
was wrong in finding an exception to liability for spouses because it contradicts the explicit
language of the Act and the clear intent of Congress); see also, e.g., Niemeyer, supra note
10, at 238-39 (reiterating that many federal courts have found no implied exception to the
Act as the clear language of the Act is controlling).
40. See. e.g., Kempf, 868 F.2d at 973 (agreeing with the Pritchard court that no ex-
press exception exists in the language of the Act); Pritchard, 732 F.2d at 374 (same); Jones,
542 F.2d at 668 (same); see also, e.g., Niemeyer, supra note 10, at 238-39 (observing that
many courts have permitted the clear and manifest language to control, thereby denying
the existence of a domestic relations exception). Courts have allowed the language of the
Act to control and have not allowed an interspousal exception for the following reasons:
1) the Act's language of making "any individual" liable includes no exception for spouses;
2) Title III's purpose was to lessen the amount of electronic surveillance throughout the
country, and is not concerned with marital conflicts; and 3) the legislative history of the
Act reveals a congressional intent to reach all private electronic surveillance, which would
also encompass domestic relations cases. Id. at 238-39.
41. See Niemeyer, supra note 10, at 241. A court will usually not refer to legislative
history in interpreting a statute if the statutory text is clear and unambiguous on its face.
See e.g., United States v. Jones, 542 F.2d 661, 667 (6th Cir. 1976) (presuming that Congress
intended a literal interpretation of the text of the statute).
42. See, e.g, Newcomb v. Ingle, 944 F.2d 1534, 1536 (10th Cir. 1991) (using legislative
history to exempt a parent from liability for wiretapping his or her child's telephone con-
versations with the other parent); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 558 F.2d 677, 678-79 (2d
Cir. 1977) (basing a parent's exemption from liability on testimony and statements made
at congressional hearings on the Act); Simpson v. Simpson, 490 F.2d 803, 807-09 (5th Cir.
1974) (noting only scattered suggestions that Congress's intention was to include inter-
spousal wiretapping under the Act).
43. See Anderman, supra note 6, at 2281 (citing a statement by Professor Schwartz at
a Senate hearing on wiretapping as one of the reasons that courts exclude family members
from liability under the Act).
44. See Niemeyer, supra note 10, at 246 ("Contrary to fundamental rules of statutory
construction, these courts postulated that since Congress did not explicitly include spouses
within an Act of such import, Congress resolved to exclude them.").
45. Right of Privacy Act of 1967: Hearings on S. 928 Before the Subcomm. on Admin.
(Vol. 50:429
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where you do not want the law involved. 46 He explained that "[w]hen a
father picks up the phone and listens in to his teenage daughter ...
maybe these [scenarios] should be excluded from the bill, but the bill
does not exclude only those. 47 Some courts have argued that this is clear
evidence that Congress intended to include a domestic relations excep-
tion in the statute. 8 Further, some federal courts instead rely on the
Act's legislative history to exempt parents from liability, noting that do-
mestic relations is a state issue which is beyond the scope of a federal
statute such as Title Ill.
4
1
In most jurisdictions Title III coincides with a similar state statute pro-
hibiting the same type of interception.0 Thus, parties generally bring suit
under both Title III and the parallel state statute." The federal rules of
jurisdiction indicate that these suits, brought under both federal and state
law, can be heard in either federal or state courts. 2 Therefore, both fed-
eral and state courts have been involved in the interpretation of Title
111.53
Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong. 377, 395 (1967)
(hereinafter Hearings) (statement of Herman Schwartz, Professor, State University of
New York Law School, on behalf of the American Civil Liberties Union).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See, e.g., Newcomb v. Ingle, 944 F.2d 1534, 1536 & n.5 (10th Cir. 1991) (citing
Professor Schwartz's statement); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 558 F.2d 677, 679 (2d Cir.
1977) (same); Campbell v. Price, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1186, 1190 (E.D. Ark. 1998) (same). But
see Anderman, supra note 6, at 2281-82 (asserting that Professor Schwartz's statement has
been taken out of context and does not imply a domestic relations exception as some
courts would hold).
49. See, e.g., Anonymous, 558 F.2d at 679 (holding that the father's taping of his
child's conversations does not rise to a violation of the federal Act and is a matter to be
handled by state courts); Simpson v. Simpson, 490 F.2d 803, 810 (5th Cir. 1974) (conclud-
ing that the facts of the case did not rise to a federal cause of action, even though the court
did look to the legislative history and the extension telephone exception).
50. See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/14-1 - 14-9 (West 1999); ALA. CODE §§
13A-11-31, 13A-11-33, 13A-11-35 (1975).
51. See, e.g., Silas v. Silas, 680 So. 2d 368, 369-70 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996) (noting that
the mother argued for exemption from liability for taping her child under both the federal
Act and section 13A-11-31 of the Alabama Code); see also Zuber, supra note 20, at 456
(acknowledging that the federal Act is the minimum constitutional standard for protection
of privacy and noting that state courts may set stricter standards if they deem it necessary
to protect their citizens from wiretapping).
52. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (delineating requirements for federal question jurisdiction);
see also Grubb v. Public Util. Comm'n of Ohio, 281 U.S. 470, 475 (1930) (maintaining that
state and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction over suits that arise under both fed-
eral and state law).
53. See Thompson v. Dulaney, 838 F. Supp. 1535, 1538 (concluding that the federal
court had subject matter jurisdiction over both state law and federal law claims that the
mother was bringing by way of supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a)); Silas,
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A. The Birth and Development of a Domestic Relations Exception
The first case under Title III to address the domestic relation excep-
tion was Simpson v. Simpson.54 The Simpson court held that a husband,
suspicious of his wife's fidelity, was not liable under Title III for taping
her conversations.5 The Simpson court was the first case to find an inter-
spousal exception in Title 111.56 The court simply stated that Title III did
not cover domestic relations as manifested by Congress' passage of the
extension telephone exception. 7 The Simpson court stated that the ex-
tension telephone exception was clear evidence that Congress did not
want to decide questions of familial relations within the context of the
Act."6
The Simpson decision created a progeny of case law that followed its
ruling.59 In Anonymous v. Anonymous,6° the Second Circuit adopted the
analysis of the Fifth Circuit in Simpson.6 Although Anonymous was the
first case to address the issue of parent-child wiretapping, the Second
Circuit used the Simpson interpretation pertaining to interspousal wire-
tapping to hold a parent exempt from liability for wiretapping his or her
child.6' The Anonymous court found that a parent taping a child's tele-
phone conversations with the other parent during a domestic dispute
680 So. 2d at 371-72 (deciding to exempt a parent from liability under both the federal Act
and the Alabama Code).
54. 490 F.2d 803 (5th Cir. 1974).
55. Id. at 804 (holding that Title III is not sufficiently specific in defining liability to
hold the husband liable for violating the Act).
56. Id. at 805. The court specifically noted that "[t]he naked language of Title III, by
virtue of its inclusiveness, reaches this case. However, we are of the opinion that Congress
did not intend such a farreaching [sic] result, one extending into areas normally left to
states, those of the marital home and domestic conflicts." Id.; see also infra note 59 (listing
subsequent cases reaffirming the Simpson holding).
57. See Simpson, 490 F.2d at 809 (noting as a further consideration the existence of an
extension telephone exception to exempt family members from liability under the federal
Act).
58. Id.
59. See Scheib v. Grant, 22 F.3d 149, 153 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that the same rea-
soning that allows an interspousal exemption to the Act also supports parent-child wire-
tapping); Newcomb v. Ingle, 944 F.2d 1534, 1536 (10th Cir. 1991) (agreeing with the Simp-
son court that Congress's intent was to stay out of domestic relations); Anonymous v.
Anonymous, 558 F.2d 677, 679 (2d Cir. 1977) (expanding Simpson's finding of a domestic
relations exception to also include parent-child wiretapping scenarios, not simply inter-
spousal wiretaps).
60. 558 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1977).
61. See id. at 679 (finding, like Simpson, that taping a conversation is no different
than permissibly overhearing it, and that therefore, a spouse was not subject to liability
under the Act for wiretapping the other spouse).
62. See id.
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over custody did not rise to the level of a Title III violation." The court
found no distinction between taping the conversations and accidentally
overhearing them, which is clearly protected by the Act through the ex-
tension telephone exception."
Ten years later, the Second Circuit again addressed the issue of parent-
child wiretapping in Janecka v. Franklin.65 Similar to Anonymous,
Janecka involved a parent taping a child's conversations with the other
parent during an ongoing custody dispute. 66 The district court in Janecka
deemed the decision in Anonymous to be controlling,6 and the Second
Circuit agreed.68 Like Anonymous, the Second Circuit found that this
type of custody dispute did not rise to a violation of Title 111,69 thereby
solidifying the parent-child exception by analogy to the telephone exten-
sion exception and the limitations on federal power over domestic dis-
putes.7°
Up until this point, the circuits that articulated a domestic relations ex-
ception to Title III had not yet held vicarious consent to be an alternate
means of exemption from liability.71 Both Janecka and Anonymous
raised the issue of vicarious consent. 72 These courts, however, found that
the facts of these cases did not warrant further judicial review by a fed-
63. Id. (concluding that custody disputes are a matter for state courts, and therefore
not actionable under federal law).
64. See id. (finding the difference between taping and overhearing a "distinction
without a difference").
65. 843 F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1988).
66. Janecka v. Franklin, 684 F. Supp. 24, 25 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), affd by 843 F.2d 110 (2d
Cir. 1988). Mr. Franklin installed a recording device on his telephone in order to record
telephone calls between his children and their mother. See id. He recorded the calls only
after he became aware of his five-year-old's emotional disturbances during telephone con-
versations with her mother. See id. at 25-26.
67. Id. at 27 (acknowledging that the court here is bound by the Second Circuit's
holding in Anonymous).
68. See Janecka, 843 F.2d at 111 (affirming the district court's decision to follow the
authority of Anonymous).
69. Both cases instead agreed that parent-child wiretapping does not rise to the level
of a violation of the federal Act. See Janecka, 684 F. Supp. at 26; Anonymous v. Anony-
mous, 558 F.2d 677, 679 (2d Cir. 1977).
70. See Janecka, 684 F. Supp. at 26 (exempting parents from liability under the Act
because it does not rise to the level of a federal violation); Anonymous, 558 F.2d at 679
(same).
71. See, e.g., Janecka, 684 F. Supp. at 26 (proclaiming the court's awareness of vicari-
ous consent, but choosing not to use it as a defense because the defendant was exempted
from liability on other grounds); Anonymous, 558 F.2d at 679-80 (voicing no need to look
at the vicarious consent defense because exemption from liability was found by other
means).
72. Janecka, 684 F. Supp. at 26; Anonymous, 558 F.2d at 679-80.
Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 50:429
eral court because the disputes were state matters, and therefore not ad-
dressed by the Act." As a result, these courts did not address the ques-
tion of vicarious consent, deciding the cases on the scope of the Act in-
stead.74  Because exemption from liability usually was found on other
grounds, most cases did not address the merits of vicarious consent di-
rectly.75
In the 1994 case of Scheib v. Grant,76 the Seventh Circuit used both the
Second and Tenth Circuit's reasoning to exempt from liability under Ti-
tle III a father who taped his son's telephone conversations with the son's
mother.7   Although the court ultimately relied on the extension tele-
phone exception to exempt the father from liability, the court adopted a
"child's-best-interest" line of reasoning, which came closer to the vicari-
78ous consent exception than had any prior case.
Recent decisions rely more heavily on the vicarious consent excep-
tion.79 The case of Silas v. Silas8° directly tackled the issue of vicarious
consent." In Silas, the court admitted into evidence tape recordings of
the children's telephone conversations with their mother in at a custody
hearing."' As a result of this admission, the court awarded custody to the
73. See Anonymous, 558 F.2d at 679 (holding that one parent taping the other par-
ent's conversations with his or her child does not rise to a violation of Title III because it is
purely a domestic matter that is better handled by the state courts). The court in Janecka
also held that the facts surrounding the case were purely domestic and should be handled
by the state courts. Janecka, 684 F. Supp. at 26.
74. See Anonymous, 558 F.2d at 679-80 (holding that because the facts of the case
were not a violation of Title III, the alternate argument of vicarious consent did not need
to be addressed by the court); Janecka, 684 F. Supp. at 26 (finding Title III inapplicable to
the case and considering it unnecessary to address the issue of vicarious consent).
75. See, e.g., Silas v. Silas, 680 So. 2d 368, 370 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996) (recognizing that
most federal courts hearing domestic relations cases under the Act had not addressed
whether a parent may consent on behalf of a minor child to permissibly record the child's
telephone conversations with the other parent).
76. 22 F.3d 149 (7th Cir. 1994).
77. See id. at 154-55 & n.6 (holding the parent not liable).
78. Id. at 154-55 (finding the parent exempt from liability by way of the extension
telephone exception by following the holding in Anonymous). The court, however, noted
that the question of whether taping the conversations was in the child's welfare was a
genuine issue of material fact that would require review by the district court if exemption
from liability had not already been found. See id.
79. See, e.g., Campbell v. Price, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1186, 1191 (E.D. Ark. 1998) (limiting a
parent's use of vicarious consent to those times when it is in the child's best interest); Silas,
680 So. 2d at 372 (finding that vicarious consent exempts a parent from liability under the
Act).
80. 680 So. 2d. 368 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996).
81. See id. at 370 (acknowledging that most courts previously had not addressed
whether a parent could vicariously consent to wiretapping on behalf of a child).
82. Id. at 369.
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father.83 The court held that because the children (ages three and five)
lacked legal capacity to consent for themselves," the father could consent
vicariously to the taping on the children's behalf after he observed that
the children became upset during telephone conversations with their
mother.8' The court concluded:
that the father had a good faith basis that was objectively rea-
sonable for believing that the minor child was being abused,
threatened, or intimidated by the mother; therefore, it was
permissible for the father to vicariously consent on behalf of the
minor child to the taping of the telephone conversations.86
The Silas court, following language set forth in Thompson v. Du-
laney,87 firmly established vicarious consent as a doctrine that would
eventually be followed by other courts. 8
B. The Flipside: No Domestic Relations Exception Found
Although some courts furthered the existence of the domestic relations
exception, others doubted its existence. 9 Many federal courts and state
courts have not agreed on cases regarding parent-child wiretapping.90
Many courts disagree on the most fundamental of issues, namely,
whether or not a domestic relations exception even exists, explicitly or
implicitly, in the federal Act.91 Additionally, some courts agree with the
83. See id.
84. See id. at 371 (stating that the children were unable "in any meaningful sense, [to]
have given actual consent, either express or implied, since they were incapable of under-
standing the nature of consent and of making a truly voluntary decision to consent").
85. See id. at 371-72.
86. Id. at 372.
87. 838 F. Supp. 1535, 1544 (D. Utah 1993) (allowing exemption under the Act for
parents if they had a good faith, objectively reasonable basis to believe the wiretapping
was necessary "to act in the best interests of the child").
88. See Silas, 680 So. 2d at 370 (using the Thompson holding as a guide for this issue
of first impression for the Alabama court); see also Pollock v. Pollock, 154 F.3d 601, 610
(6th Cir. 1998) (limiting the use of the vicarious consent doctrine to occasions when there
is a good faith, objectively reasonable belief that it is in the child's best interest to tape the
conversations); Campbell v. Price, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1186, 1191 (E.D. Ark. 1998) (same).
89. See, e.g., Heggy v. Heggy, 944 F.2d 1537, 1540 (10th Cir. 1991) (rejecting the
holding of the Simpson court, and finding congressional intent to include domestic rela-
tions liability under the Act); United States v. Jones, 542 F.2d 661, 666-67 (6th Cir. 1976)
(deciding that the Act was not definite or specific enough to exclude liability under the
Act).
90. See Niemeyer, supra note 10, at 239 (asserting that courts are divided over inter-
spousal wiretapping and citing the recent increase in parent-child wiretapping as aggra-
vating the dispute).
91. See id. at 242-43 (implying that the judicial split on interspousal wiretapping may
exist because it is unclear whether Congress intended to include spousal liability under the
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concept of vicarious consent, but are reluctant to use it in all cases.92
Because Title III is devoid of language creating a domestic relations
exception,93 many courts have read an implicit exception into the stat-
ute.94 United States v. Jones95 was the first case to take a hard-line ap-
proach to Title III and its interpretations. 96 Jones, a Sixth Circuit case,
decided after Simpson but before Anonymous, created the split in the
circuits regarding interspousal wiretapping. 9 The Jones court cited evi-
dence in the legislative history of the Act to show Congress's intention to
include domestic relations matters within the Act. 98 This evidence, ac-
cording to the court, demonstrated that Congress was aware of the extent
of wiretapping in domestic disputes, although it chose not to make an ex-
ception for it.99 The Sixth Circuit emphatically disagreed with the rea-
Act to stop private citizens from invading each other's privacy, or, conversely whether
some exceptions do exist).
92. See, e.g., Pollock, 154 F.3d at 610 (choosing to adopt the vicarious consent doc-
trine but declining to apply it under the facts of the case because a question of material
fact existed as to the mother's motivations for taping the child); Williams v. Williams, 581
N.W.2d 777, 780 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998) (prohibiting the use of vicarious consent, even
though the court could conceive of situations where it would be valuable).
93. See Niemeyer, supra note 10, at 237.
94. See, e.g., Newcomb v. Ingle, 944 F.2d 1534, 1536 (10th Cir. 1991) (exempting fam-
ily members from liability under the Act by a broad reading of the extension telephone
exception); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 558 F.2d 677, 679 (2d Cir. 1977) (using the legisla-
tive history, the court found no violation of the federal Act because it is a matter to be
handled by the state courts); Simpson v. Simpson, 490 F.2d 803, 809 (5th Cir. 1974) (sup-
porting a finding that Congress did not intend to include family members or spouses as
liable under the Act).
95. 542 F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1976).
96. Compare id. at 670 (holding that intercepting any person's telephone conversa-
tions is a violation of Title 1It, regardless of spousal or familial status), with Anonymous,
558 F.2d at 679 (finding an exception under the Act for parent-child wiretapping), and
Simpson, 490 F.2d at 809 (holding an exception under the Act for interspousal wiretapping
cases).
97. Compare Jones, 542 F.2d at 667 (holding that the language of Title III expresses a
clear prohibition on all wiretapping unless specifically exempted, which interspousal wire-
tapping is not), with Simpson, 490 F.2d at 806 (finding that there is no clear indication in
the language of the Act that Congress intended to intrude into marital relations).
98. Jones, 542 F.2d at 668 (stating that the testimony of Professor Blakey evidenced
Congress'ss intent to include domestic relations liability under the Act). Professor Robert
Blakey, credited with being the author of Title III, testified at the congressional hearings
on the Right to Privacy Act of 1967 that "private bugging in this country can be divided
into two broad categories, commercial espionage and marital litigation." Right to Privacy
Act of 1967: Hearings on S. 928 Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Practice and Procedure,
90th Cong. 413 (1967) (statement of Robert G. Blakey, Professor, Notre Dame Law
School). The Jones court took this statement as proof that Congress knew about private
bugging in marital litigation and intended the Act to cover it as a result. Jones, 542 F.2d at
667 & n.10.
99. See Jones, 542 F.2d at 668 ("[T]he legislative history leaves no doubt that the Act
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soning in Simpson, which held that a domestic relations exception existed
under Title III, and continues to do so."
Although the Sixth Circuit found no statutory exception for spouses in
the language of Title III, the court was more willing to consider an excep-
tion for parent-child wiretapping.01 Recently the Sixth Circuit and the
Court of Appeals of Michigan analyzed the exception for parent-child
wiretapping through the vicarious consent approach.0 2
In Williams v. Williams, °3 the Michigan Court of Appeals took a hard-
line approach to vicarious consent.)° The court held that vicarious con-
sent by a parent on behalf of a child is never allowed."" The court stated
that it could conceive of instances where vicarious consent would be nec-
essary, but the danger of liberal application of the doctrine was far worse
than banning it altogether.' 6 The court reasoned that, because the Act is
silent as to a vicarious consent exception, no such exception exists.' 7
Further, if such a safe harbor provision were needed, Congress would
have created one.'0 ' The Williams court, however, did defer the issue of
vicarious consent, stating that it was within Congress's authority to de-
cide, not within the judiciary's consent. 0'
The most recent case to address the issue of vicarious consent is Pol-
lock v. Pollock."° Even though the case arose in the Sixth Circuit and
was bound by the Jones decision to extend liability under the Act to do-
was intended to reach private electronic surveillance and that Congress was aware that a
major area of use for surveillance techniques was the preparation of domestic relations
cases.").
100. See id. at 671 (disputing the Simpson court's use of the limited legislative history
to find an exception for domestic relations within the statute).
101. Compare id. at 673 (finding no implied interspousal exception under Title III),
with Pollock v. Pollock, 154 F.3d 601, 610 (6th Cir. 1998) (adopting the vicarious consent
exception in the Sixth Circuit to exempt parents from liability, although not applying it
here for other reasons).
102. See Pollock, 154 F.3d at 610; Williams v. Williams, 581 N.W.2d 777, 780-81 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1998).
103. 581 N.W.2d 777 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998).




107. See id. at 780
108. See id. (stating that if Congress intended a vicarious consent doctrine to allow ex-
emption from liability under the Act for parents, they would have explicitly included an
exemption in the language of the Act itself).
109. Id. at 781 ("We instead commend to the legislative branch the delicate question
of the extent of privacy that family members may expect within their home vis-A-vis each
other.").
110. 154 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1998) (adopting the doctrine of vicarious consent).
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mestic relations cases, the court was reluctant to follow precedent."' The
court agreed that a vicarious consent exception exists,"' but limited its
application in Pollock, and refused to follow it in the circumstances of
that case."'
The Pollock court used reasoning similar to that in Silas when it re-
stricted the use of vicarious consent to only those times when the con-
senting parent can "demonstrate a good faith, objectively reasonable ba-
sis for believing such consent [is] necessary for the welfare of the
child. ''" 4 Although the court agreed with the vicarious consent doctrine
in theory, the court declined to apply it because it questioned the
mother's good faith reason for taping her child."5
C. Continuing Court Confusion Over Title III
Case law addressing the Act becomes increasingly disharmonious with
each new decision."6 The Tenth Circuit has found it difficult to follow
the very law that it set forth."7 Also, the Tenth Circuit seems to make a
111. The Pollock court is bound to follow the Jones decision based on the doctrine of
stare decisis. See Matthew F. Weil and William C. Rooklidge, Stare Un-Decisis: The
Sometimes Rough Treatment of Precedent in Federal Circuit Decision-Making, 80 J. PAT.
[& TRADEMARK] OFF. Soc'Y 791, 792 (defining the doctrine of stare decisis as "the policy
of the courts '[t]o abide by, or adhere to, decided cases'). If a court decides to depart
from the doctrine of stare decisis, it must have special justification for doing so. See Ari-
zona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984). However, courts are not constrained to follow
bad decisions or ones that are no longer workable. See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Flor-
ida, 517 U.S. 44,63 (1996).
112. See Pollock, 154 F.3d at 610 ("We conclude that although the child in this case is
older than the children in the cases discussed above in which the doctrine of vicarious con-
sent has been adopted, we agree with the district court's adoption of the doctrine.").
113. See id. (limiting the use of vicarious consent to those times when the parent has a
good faith, objectively reasonable basis in the best interests of the child to vicariously con-
sent to the taping of telephone conversations with the other parent).
114. Id. (adopting the standard set forth in Thompson v. Dulaney, 838 F. Supp. 1535,
1541 (D. Utah 1993)). The Silas court also adopted the standard set forth in Thompson v.
Dulaney by allowing a vicarious consent exception in those cases where a parent has a
good faith, objectively reasonable aim in wiretapping his or her child. Silas v. Silas, 680
So. 2d 368, 371 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996).
115. See Pollock, 154 F.3d at 611 (disagreeing with the district court by finding a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether the mother taped in the child's best interest).
116. See, e.g., Leben, supra note 3, at 28 (recognizing that the Tenth Circuit's case law
on the issue of domestic relations exceptions to liability under the Act are not straightfor-
ward). For example, the most recent case law on the issue, Pollock v. Pollock, 154 F.3d
601 (6th Cir. 1998), and Williams v. Williams, 581 N.W.2d 777 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998), both
ultimately denied the vicarious consent defense to the defendant, but Pollock was willing
to use the doctrine under different circumstances, whereas Williams was not.
117. Compare Heggy v. Heggy, 944 F.2d 1537, 1540 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that Title
III does not intend to prohibit liability for eavesdropping in domestic relations cases), with
[Vol. 50:429
Parent-Child Wiretapping: Is Title III Enough?
clear distinction between interspousal wiretapping and parent-child wire-
tapping.' 8 As a result of this distinction, the two situations are treated
differently under the law of the Tenth Circuit."9
S 120
In Heggy v. Heggy, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the Fourth, Sixth
and Eighth Circuits that interspousal wiretapping was a violation of Title
III.1" Its reasoning, similar to the Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits,
noted that the clear and unambiguous language of Title III provides noS 122
exception; thus, none exists.
The Tenth Circuit, however, neglected to associate this same reasoning
with respect to parent-child wiretapping. In Newcomb v. Ingle, the
court held that under a broad reading of the extension telephone excep-
tion, a family member may tape a conversation of another in the home.'
2
1
The court reasoned that interspousal wiretapping is "qualitatively differ-
ent from a custodial parent taping a minor child's conversations within
Newcomb v. Ingle, 944 F.2d 1534, 1536 (10th Cir. 1991) (exempting a parent for wiretap-
ping the telephone conversations of his or her child with the other parent because Con-
gress intended to exclude domestic relations cases from the purview of Title III via the ex-
tension telephone exception).
118. See, e.g., Newcomb, 944 F.2d at 1535-36 (stating that interspousal wiretapping is
qualitatively different than parent-child wiretapping). The Court did not explain why or
how the two situations were different. See id.
119. See Thompson v. Dulaney, 970 F.2d 744, 748 (10th Cir. 1992) (allowing the vicari-
ous consent exception to exempt parents from liability under Title 1II), on remand to 838
F. Supp. 1535 (D. Utah 1993); Heggy, 944 F.2d at 1540 (allowing no exception for inter-
spousal wiretapping); Newcomb, 944 F.2d at 1535-36 (allowing an exception for parent-
child wiretapping through the telephone extension exception).
120. 944 F.2d 1537 (10th Cir. 1991).
121. Id. at 1539 (holding that Title III does not make an exception for interspousal
wiretapping because of the clear and unambiguous language of the statute); see also,
Kempf v. Kempf, 868 F.2d 970, 973 (8th Cir. 1989) (concluding there is "no legal basis for
Title III or its legislative history to insulate a spouse in this situation from the Title's reach
or its civil penalties"); Pritchard v. Pritchard, 732 F.2d 372, 374 (4th Cir. 1984) (finding that
"Title III prohibits all wiretapping activities unless specifically excepted"); United States
v. Jones, 542 F.2d 661, 667 (6th Cir. 1976) (stating that the language of § 2511(1)(a) clearly
expresses a prohibition on all wiretapping beyond those explicit exceptions in the statute).
122. See Heggy, 944 F.2d at 1540-41. The Heggy court claimed that the legislative his-
tory of Title III showed Congress'ss awareness of the large use of wiretapping devices and
their intent to prohibit the use of these devices. See id. (using the remarks of Senator
Long, Professor Blakey, and Senator Hruska in the Act's legislative history to determine
congressional awareness of the widespread use of domestic wiretapping at the Act's incep-
tion).
123. See Newcomb, 944 F.2d at 1536 (permitting a broad reading of the extension tele-
phone exception to allow an exemption from liability under the Act for parent-child wire-
tapping); Thompson, 838 F.Supp. at 1545 (allowing an exemption from liability for parent-
child wiretapping by way of the vicarious consent doctrine).
124. 944 F.2d 1534 (10th Cir. 1991).
125. Id. at 1536.
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the family home."'' 6 The court gave no indication as to why the situa-
tions were "qualitatively different," but found that the parent was not li-
able under Title III based on the extension telephone exception. 7 The
Newcomb court followed the reasoning set forth in Simpson and
Anonymous by finding no liability through the extension telephone ex-
ception.
2 1
The Tenth Circuit solidified the distinction between interspousal wire-
tapping and parent-child wiretapping in Thompson v. Dulaney. 29 De-
cided on vicarious consent grounds, Thompson widened the spectrum of
Tenth Circuit decisions interpreting Title 111. "0 The Thompson court
held that a wife could vicariously consent on behalf of her children, al-
though not under the particular facts of the case. 3' The court held that
situations involving vicarious consent are not subject to Title III liability
because vicarious consent cases usually deal with children lacking the le-
gal capacity to consent due to their age.'32 The court reasoned that if a
child lacks the legal capacity to consent for himself, the parent has a right
to do so; thus, fitting such a situation into the consent exception of the
Act.
133
The Thompson court, however, did make efforts to distinguish its
holding from Heggy, the Tenth Circuit case rendering spouses liable for
wiretapping under Title 111.13' For example, the court focused on the is-
sue of intent in the interception. The court stated that, barring a spe-
126. Id. at 1535-36.
127. Id. at 1536.
128. Id. (exempting family members from liability under the extension telephone ex-
ception in 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5)(a)(i));see also, Anonymous v. Anonymous, 558 F.2d 677,
679 (2d Cir. 1977) (using the extension telephone exception as further evidence of Con-
gress's intent to stay out of familial relations and leave these matters to state courts);
Simpson v. Simpson, 490 F.2d 803, 809 (5th Cir. 1974) (considering as another reason for
an interspousal exception to Title III, the existence of the extension telephone exception).
129. 970 F.2d 744 (10th Cir. 1992), on remand to 838 F. Supp. 1535 (D. Utah 1993).
130. Thompson, 838 F. Supp. at 1544.
131. Id. (basing the decision to not exempt the mother from liability on factual reasons
pertaining to the case). Evidence submitted during the trial indicated that the conversa-
tions between the mother and child were not harmless. See id.
132. See id. (recognizing a parental right to consent on behalf of their children because
they lack legal capacity to consent and cannot give actual consent for themselves).
133. See id.
134. Id. at 1541 (noting that the Heggy court made wiretapping between spouses ille-
gal under those circumstances where the interception was intentional). The vicarious con-
sent defense used in Thompson is a defense that exists to override the intentionality of the
wiretapping and is therefore not liable under the Act if found to be done for a good faith,
objectively reasonable aim. Id. at 1542-44.
135. See id. at 1542 ("'Defendant's act must [be shown to] have been the product of
defendant's conscious objective rather than the product of mistake or an accident."')
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cific exception exempting him or her from liability, a person could only
be held liable under the Act for intentionally, rather than inadvertently,
intercepting a communication.136 The court explained that the spouse
was liable in Heggy because intent existed without falling into one of Ti-
tle III's exceptions.'37 The court, finding that vicarious consent is a statu-
tory exception, held that the wife in Thompson could not be found liable
if the factual circumstances of the case allowed for its use.'38 Accord-
ingly, within the Tenth Circuit there is now a clear dichotomy of rulings
between interspousal and parent-child wiretapping.39
II. THE GREAT DIVIDE: LANGUAGE OR LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Fundamentally, judicial indecision regarding the Act is a matter of
statutory interpretation. 140 This division is of particular concern to many
attorneys because inconsistency in decisions makes it difficult to advise
clients involved in delicate familial disputes.'4'
(quoting United States v. Townsend, 987 F.2d 927, 930 (2d Cir. 1993)).
136. See id.
137. See id. at 1541 (concluding that the wife in Heggy had the requisite intent).
138. Id. at 1544. By way of showing the circumstances under which vicarious consent
could be used lawfully as a defense by a parent, the Thompson court stated,
In this case, or perhaps a more extreme example of a parent who was making
abusive or obscene phone calls threatening or intimidating minor children, vi-
carious consent is necessary to enable the guardian to protect the children from
further harassment in the future. Thus, as long as the guardian has a good faith
basis that is objectively reasonable for believing that it is necessary to consent on
behalf of her minor children to the taping of the phone conversations, vicarious
consent will be permissible in order for the guardian to fulfill her statutory man-
date to act in the best interests of the children.
Id.
139. See id. at 1544 (allowing vicarious consent to be an exemption to liability under
the Act for parent-child wiretapping cases); Heggy v. Heggy, 944 F.2d 1537, 1540 (10th
Cir. 1991) (prohibiting an exemption from liability under the Act for situations of inter-
spousal wiretapping); Newcomb v. Ingle, 944 F.2d 1534, 1536 (10th Cir. 1991) (permitting
parent-child wiretapping under the extension telephone exception).
140. See Williams, supra note 23, at 526 (highlighting the split among the federal cir-
cuit courts on whether Title III covers domestic relations cases). The court in Heggy v.
Heggy characterized the debate over interpretation of the statute. Heggy, 944 F.2d at
1540. The Heggy court felt no need to resort to looking to legislative history because the
statute was clear and unambiguous on its face. Id. However, the appellant in Heggy urged
adoption of the Simpson court's view in which legislative history was looked at to find
Congress's intent for the statute. Id.
141. See Zuber, supra note 20, at 456. The Tenth Circuit's split in decisions allowing
an exception for parent-child wiretapping but not allowing an exception for interspousal
wiretapping is an area "fraught with danger" for the family law attorney. Id. Zuber rec-
ognizes that the Tenth Circuit's discontinuity makes advising clients on the probable out-
come of their claim difficult. See id. To further this difficulty in advising clients is the rec-
ognition of possible ethical consequences an attorney may face if he or she advises a
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Two interpretations of Title III have spawned the great division be-
tween the circuits. 4 1 On the one hand, courts argue that the statute is
clear and unambiguous on its face and does not include a domestic rela-
tions exception.' Conversely, other courts argue that Congress intended
a domestic relations exception to exist in the statute, as evidenced by its
legislative history.'"
A. The Language Approach: the Plain Statutory Language Controls
For courts that look directly to the language of the statute for their in-
terpretation, there is no place within the Act providing any explicit ex-
ception for marital or familial cases. 145 In fact, the language is quite clear:
"any person" is liable under the Act for wiretapping unless they fall into
either the telephone extension or consent exception.4 6 Therefore, any
person, including spouses or other family members, could be liable under
the Act. 4 1 Courts have concluded that the reach of the statute clearly in-
cludes domestic relations situations by proscribing any person from wire-
parent to tape their child's telephone conversations. See Hon. Robert L. Gottsfield, Ethics
Caveat to Taping Kids, ARIZONA ATr'Y, Feb. 1999, at 11. For example, Arizona permits
the recording of telephone conversations if there is consent by one party. See id. (noting
A.R.S. § 13-3005A allows the interception of telephone conversations when there is one
party that consents to the interception). However, the Arizona Committee on Ethics
adopted a general rule that made it a violation of the Professional Rules of Conduct for an
attorney to advise a non-lawyer client to tape record any conversation the client may have
with a third party. See AZ Comm. on the Rules of Prof'l Conduct, Formal Op. 75-13
(1975). Therefore, in some jurisdictions, it may not be a violation of Title III or a parallel
state statute for a parent to tape his or her child's telephone conversations under certain
circumstances. However, that same permissible taping may be an ethical violation if an
attorney advises his or her client to do so. See Gottsfield, supra, at 11 (emphasizing to at-
torneys that actions that may be lawful are not always ethical). This is the real dilemma
faced by attorneys.
142. See generally Niemeyer, supra note 10, at 237 (categorizing the two interpreta-
tions of Title III as either allowing no domestic relations exception because the language is
clear and unambiguous or recognizing the legislative history of the Act shows Congress'ss
intent to include a domestic relations exception).
143. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 542 F.2d 661, 667 (6th Cir. 1976); see also Kempf
v. Kempf, 868 F.2d 970, 973 (8th Cir. 1989); Pritchard v. Pritchard, 732 F.2d 372, 373 (4th
Cir. 1984); State v. Shaw, 404 S.E.2d 887, 889 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991).
144. See, e.g., Scheib v. Grant, 22 F.3d 149, 154 (7th Cir. 1994); Anonymous v.
Anonymous, 558 F.2d 677, 679 (2d Cir. 1977); Simpson v. Simpson, 490 F.2d 803, 809 (5th
Cir. 1974).
145. See Niemeyer, supra note 10, at 238-39 (recognizing that the Fourth, Sixth and
Eighth Circuits have used the clear and manifest language of the statute to find no implied
exception for spouses or family members).
146. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) (1994).
147. See id.; see also infra note 150 and accompanying text (giving examples of courts
that found no exemption for family members or spouses under the Act's language).
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tapping except as specifically provided in the statute.14 8 Generally, if the
bare language of a statute is unambiguous and the clear intent of Con-
gress is expressed, the language is controlling.14 ' Therefore, there is no
reason to look to the legislative history to interpret the statute.50
Courts adhering to the language approach acknowledge that Congress
was aware of the use of electronic surveillance in marital and familial
cases.151 Congress recognized its use, but provided no protection for
these cases through a clearly stated exception. 2 Courts argue that this
lack of exception proves Congress's intent to include domestic relations
liability under the Act.
5
1
These courts also argue that the legislative history does not prove• 1 5 4
Congress intended for a domestic relations exception to exist. Rather,
these courts assert that the legislative history provides even more conclu-
sive proof of Congress's intent to include domestic relations cases under
the Act.' Despite knowing the amount of surveillance used in domestic
relations cases, Congress remained silent regarding an exemption from
148. See, e.g., Heggy v. Heggy, 944 F.2d 1537, 1540 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that a
husband could not tape his wife's telephone conversations because the statute clearly pro-
hibits the interception of communications by any person); United States v. Jones, 542 F.2d
661, 667 (6th Cir. 1976) (expressing that the language of the Act puts a blanket prohibition
on all electronic surveillance, except those scenarios specifically named in the Act); State
v. Shaw, 404 S.E.2d 887, 889 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991) (conceding that Title III makes no ex-
press exception exempting family members from liability for wiretapping one another).
149. See United States v. Underhill, 813 F.2d 105, 111 (6th Cir. 1987); see also
Niemeyer, supra note 10, at 241 (emphasizing that the language of a statute controls when,
like Title III, it is unambiguous and clearly expresses Congress'ss intent to include spouses
and family members as liable under the Act).
150. See, e.g., Heggy, 944 F.2d at 1540 (noting no need to resort to legislative history,
because the reach of the statute is clear on its face).
151. See, e.g., id. at 1540-41 (citing statements from Sen. Long and Professor Robert
Blakey as evidence of congressional awareness of the use of eavesdropping in domestic
cases); Jones, 542 F.2d at 669 & n.14 (emphasizing Professor Robert Blakey's testimony at
a Senate hearing as clear evidence of congressional awareness of domestic wiretapping).
Professor Blakey testified that "[t]he widespread use of electronic surveillance techniques
in this country by private hands is an abomination. I can find no justification for their use
and, thus, I welcome the attempt of the Right of Privacy Act to strike at these practices."
Hearings, supra note 45, at 412 (statement of Robert G. Blakey, Professor, Notre Dame
Law School).
152. See Heggy, 944 F.2d at 1540 (agreeing that the legislative history shows congres-
sional awareness of the use of wiretapping in domestic relations cases; evidencing a choice
by Congress to provide no exception for domestic relations scenarios).
153. See, e.g., id.; Jones, 542 F.2d at 668-69 & n.14; State v. Shaw, 404 S.E.2d 887, 889
(N.C. Ct. App. 1991).
154. See, e.g., Jones, 542 F.2d at 668 (stating that the legislative history of Title III
leaves no doubt as to Congress'ss intentions to impose liability under the Act to domestic
relations cases).
155. See, e.g., id.
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liability.156 Title III accomplishes its goals indiscriminately by making any
person liable for wiretapping, not a stated few."'
B. The Legislative History Approach: There is More to the Act than Meets
the Eye
There is another school of thought regarding Title III interpretation.
Although no exception is clearly stated, some courts reasoned that Con-
118gress intended a domestic relations exception to exist. A number of
courts followed this interpretation by holding that a domestic relations
exception exists, thereby exempting spouses and family members from
liability.59 These courts allow an interspousal and parent-child exception
to the Act because: (1) the extension telephone and consent exceptions
indicate Congress' intent to exclude domestic relations cases; and (2)
Congress's intent was not to reach into the arena of domestic affairs.'16
First, courts contend that the mere existence of a consent exception
and extension telephone exception proves Congress's intent to include a
156. See Heggy, 944 F.2d at 1541 ("[H]ad it been the intent of Congress to keep inter-
spousal wiretapping beyond the reach of Title III, Congress could have expressly excluded
such wiretapping when it amended certain parts of Title III in the Electronic Communica-
tions Privacy Act of 1986."). The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 was an
Act amending several provisions of Title I1. See What is the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act ("ECPA") (visited Aug. 17, 1999) <http://www.people.virginia.edu/-klb6q/
infopaper/ECPA.html>. However, neither the consent exception nor the telephone ex-
tension exception were substantially changed from their original form. See Steven P.
Garmisa, Court Refuses to Bar Surreptitious Tape Recordings, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Nov.
24, 1995, at 6 (noting that the ECPA amended nearly every section in the federal Act, but
did not touch the judicially created domestic relations exemptions found in the Act,
namely the extension telephone and consent exceptions).
157. See, e.g., Shaw, 404 S.E.2d at 889 (finding that Congress'ss use of the word "any
individual" in the language of the Act includes "any family member").
158. See generally Niemeyer, supra note 10, at 237-38 (enumerating the various courts
that have refused to find liability under the Act for spouses and family members who wire-
tap each other).
159. See, e.g., Scheib v. Grant, 22 F.3d 149, 154 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that Congress
could have set forth in greater detail the extension telephone exception, but its failure to
do so is not a reason to deny looking to Congress's intent for interpretation of the statute);
Campbell v. Price, 2 F. Supp.2d 1186, 1189-90 (E.D. Ark. 1998) (recognizing that the Act
does include a domestic relations exception through both the consent exception and ex-
tension telephone exception).
160. See Niemeyer, supra note 10, at 238 (listing the explicit inclusion of the extension
telephone exception as a reason why Congress intended to exclude domestic relations
cases from liability under the Act); see also Thompson v. Dulaney, 838 F. Supp. 1535, 1543
(D. Utah 1993) (observing that Congress intended the consent exception to be interpreted
broadly); In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890) (noting a domestic relations exception
in federal diversity jurisdiction in custodial and visitation proceedings because domestic
relations are a matter of state, not federal, law). This continuing limitation of federal
power applies to all domestic relations scenarios. See Stephens, supra note 19, at 1050.
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domestic relations exception to the Act. 16' The courts reason that both
the consent and extension telephone scenarios are more likely to happen
in the context of a residential setting; therefore, these scenarios must be
excluded from liability under the Act.
16
1
The holding of the Simpson court best describes the line of reasoning
that courts use to find a domestic relations exception to the Act.'63 The
Simpson court concluded that the main purpose of the Act was to en-
hance crime control, not to influence domestic disputes.' 64 Further, the
court relied on the extension telephone exception as evidence of Con-
gress's intent to exclude from the Act's purview telephone conversations
intercepted between household members .' Because intercepting a call
by picking up another line in the house is not a violation of the Act, the
court concluded that any method of intercepting calls between family
members must also be excluded from liability.
66
The Simpson court construed Congress to have made an exception to
liability even though Congress did not clearly express such an intent in
166
the Act. 16 The court believed that Congress did not wish to become in-
volved in familial relations, an issue generally limited to the states.66 The
Simpson court, using Professor Schwartz's statement at a United States
161. See, e.g., Newcomb v. Ingle, 944 F.2d 1534, 1536 (10th Cir. 1991) (concluding that
the existence of the extension telephone exception is evidence of Congress's intent to ab-
jure from deciding domestic relations cases); see also e.g., Thompson, 838 F. Supp. at 1543
(finding that permitting voluntary consent through the consent exception is a legal issue to
be addressed by the court).
162. See Stephens, supra note 19, at 1049 (speculating that less privacy exists in a
shared residence because of another individual's presence in that dwelling). Because of
the closeness of the marital and familial relationship and the lowered expectation of pri-
vacy as a result of a shared residence, domestic relations cases must be outside of the pur-
view of the Act. See id.
163. Simpson v. Simpson, 490 F.2d 803, 806 (5th Cir. 1974) (holding that Congress's
intention to not include domestic relations cases under liability for the Act is evidenced by
the inclusion of the telephone extension exception and through the legislative history); see
also Niemeyer, supra note 10, at 244 (providing that the Simpson case gives an extensive
analysis of the legislative history of the Act that has been used to find a domestic relations
exception).
164. Simpson, 490 F.2d at 806 (reviewing the legislative history and finding that the
Act's major purpose is crime control). The Simpson court further noted that Title III was
intended to protect citizens from invasions of privacy through the use of complicated sur-
veillance equipment. Id.
165. See Id. at 809.
166. See id. (seeing no distinction between overhearing a person's telephone conversa-
tion in the family home, which is permissible under the Act, and the ability to overhear via
an installed tape recorder as presented here). Both scenarios, according to Simpson, are
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Senate hearing, in which he denied that the possible broad scope of li-
ability under the Act was Congress's intent, decided that a specific excep-
tion exists for domestic relations cases.1 69 Other courts have followed this
reasoning in finding a domestic relations exception through the Act's
legislative history. 70
Further, many courts found that cases involving wiretapping between
spouses or family members are purely domestic conflicts, and should be
left to the states to adjudicate. 7' The states historically make the judicial
determinations that govern domestic conflicts.' Courts argue that this
long history makes the federal courts reluctant to meddle in familial af-
fairs."' For example, the Janecka court, citing the holding of Anony-
mous, found that Congress's intent in enacting the Act was not to "fur-
nish a vehicle for the importation into federal court of matters so
peculiarly within the exclusive province of state tribunals."'74
Next, courts did not want to invade areas usually left to state legisla-
169. See Hearings, supra note 45, at 377 (statement of Herman Schwartz, Professor,
State University of New York Law School, on behalf of the American Civil Liberties Un-
ion); see also supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text (discussing how Professor
Schwartz's statement has affected decisions courts have made regarding exemption from
liability under the Act). But see Anderman, supra note 6, at 2281-82 (arguing that courts
should not interpret Professor Schwartz's statement as advocating a domestic relations
exception, but rather that exceptions should be determined on a case-by-case basis).
170. See, e.g., Newcomb v. Ingle, 944 F.2d 1534, 1535-36 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding, as
did the Simpson court, that Title III does not cover liability for domestic relations cases);
Anonymous v. Anonymous, 558 F.2d 677, 679 (2d Cir. 1977) (agreeing with the reasoning
used by the Simpson court and allowing exclusion from liability under the Act for family
members).
171. See, e.g., Anonymous, 558 F.2d at 679 (acknowledging that the facts in cases in-
volving parent-child wiretapping are better handled by state courts); Janecka v. Franklin,
684 F. Supp. 24, 26 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), affd by 843 F.2d 110 (2nd Cir. 1988) (observing that
the case of parent-child wiretapping in custody disputes clearly belongs in state court
rather than federal court), affd by 843 F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1988).
172. See, e.g., Perfit v. Perfit, 693 F. Supp. 851, 855-56 (C.D. Cal. 1988) (declining to
apply federal law to domestic conflicts between spouses because of the long tradition state
courts have in dealing with these issues); see also Stephens, supra note 19, at 1051 (high-
lighting the special state interest in adjudicating domestic relations disputes). States have
the specialized ability to interpret their specific statutes regarding marriage, divorce and
domestic relations matters. See id.
As a result of their traditional role, state courts have developed a proficiency and
expertise in the area that cannot be matched in federal courts. While competent
in the application and interpretation of federal statutes, the federal courts have
limited experience in the area of domestic law, risking protracted litigation and
administrative delays.
Id. at 1051-52.
173. See, e.g., Anonymous, 558 F.2d at 679; Perfit, 693 F. Supp. at 855-56; Lizza v.
Lizza, 631 F. Supp. 529, 532-33 (E.D.N.Y. 1986).
174. Janecka, 684 F. Supp. at 26 (citing Anonymous, 558 F.2d at 679).
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tures. 175 States enact the statutes regarding domestic conflicts, divorce,
and custody without federal intervention. 76 Consequently, many federal
courts explain that holding family members liable under the Act invades
the states' domestic relations authority.
77
C. Vicarious Consent-Closer Resolution or Further Division?
Even though the two approaches have not agreed on the existence of a
domestic relations exception, many courts agree that the vicarious con-
sent doctrine may be warranted for cases involving intrafamilial wiretap-
ping.178 Even courts that consider only the language of Title III for their
interpretation have recognized vicarious consent as a necessary doctrine
in some circumstances.
79
The telephone extension exception appears to apply only to commer-
cial activities, but some courts have found no reason why Congress would
exempt a business extension and not an extension in the home. 8  It is
likely that businesses expect a certain amount of their calls to be moni-
175. See, e.g., Anonymous, 558 F.2d at 679 (emphasizing that custody disputes are a
matter under the purview of the state courts); Simpson v. Simpson, 490 F.2d 803, 805 (5th
Cir. 1974) (stating that issues regarding tapping within the marital home involve an area
generally left to the states).
176. See Stephens, supra note 19, at 1051. In Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734-35
(1877), overruled on other grounds by Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), the Supreme
Court proclaimed that "[tihe State... has absolute right to prescribe the conditions upon
which the marriage relation between its own citizens shall be created, and the causes for
which it may be dissolved." For example, the Supreme Court upheld state residency re-
strictions regulating how couples may obtain a divorce. See Stephens, supra note 19, at
1051 n.121 (citing the holding of Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 409 (1975)).
177. See, e.g., Anonymous, 558 F.2d at 679 (indicating that the facts presented were a
purely domestic conflict, which are best handled by the state courts); Simpson, 490 F.2d at
805 (acknowledging that the states normally handle issues arising in the marital home or
domestic conflicts); Janecka, 684 F. Supp. at 26 (agreeing with the Anonymous court in
leaving matters such as domestic wiretapping under the jurisdiction of the states).
178. See, e.g., Pollock v. Pollock, 154 F.3d 601, 610 (6th Cir. 1998); Thompson v. Du-
laney, 838 F. Supp. 1535, 1544 (D. Utah 1993).
179. See, e.g., Pollock, 154 F.3d at 612 (adopting the vicarious consent doctrine but
failing to use it under the facts of the case because of questions arising as to the motives of
the mother); Williams v. Williams, 581 N.W.2d 777, 780-81 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998) (admit-
ting that there are situations in which vicarious consent should be used but denying its
adoption within the state because of the potential negative results in practice).
180. See, e.g., Newcomb v. Ingle, 944 F.2d 1534, 1536 (10th Cir. 1991) (concluding that
it would be illogical for Congress to include an exemption for business extensions but not
one in the home); see also, e.g., Simpson v. Simpson, 490 F.2d 803, 809 (5th Cir. 1974) ("[it
is clear that Congress did not intend to prohibit a person from intercepting a family mem-
ber's telephone conversations by use of an extension phone in the family home ... [the
extension phone exception] directly covers this point.").
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tored because of the volume of calls they place to other businesses.8" Is
the same true for the home? Generally, interceptions that happen in the
home by picking up a line that another person is on are accidental, not
intentional. 82 Title III does not punish those interceptions.' 83 However,
installing a recording device on a phone to tape another is intentional
and results in liability under Title III.' 4 This distinction could explain
why the courts began deciding cases of parent-child wiretapping on vi-
carious consent grounds.'
The Williams court, which denied the use of vicarious consent in all
situations, recognized the value of having the vicarious consent doc-
trine.8 6 Even in light of this value, the court held that allowing vicarious
consent in some situations would be more detrimental than banning it
altogether.' 7 The court reasoned that vicarious consent generated wide-
spread implications because all parents would be afforded the statute's
protection, even those with less than worthy motives.' The Williams
court, in recognizing that vicarious consent permits a parent to take any
action necessary to provide for a child's best interest, considered this all-
inclusive power dangerous because it made the scope of parental power
unlimited.89 Thus, vicarious consent was a valuable doctrine, but not one
181. See Anderman, supra note 6, at 2275 (detailing situations where business calls
could be recorded such as 911 emergency services and quality control in telemarketing
services).
182. See id. at 2276 (noting that interceptions within the home are arguably unpunish-
able because they do not fulfill the requirement for liability under Title III that intercep-
tions be intentional).
183. See supra notes 30 and 31 and accompanying text (describing the ordinary course
of business exemption under the extension telephone exception); Anderman, supra note 6,
at 2276. Intrusions of privacy such as the casual and unintentional overhearing of a con-
versation of a family member are expected and should not be punished under Title III.
See id. Originally, the statute required only willfulness to intercept, but it was amended,
and now requires intentional interceptions in order to be liable under the Act. See New-
comb, 944 F.2d at 1535 n.2.
184. See Heggy v. Heggy, 944 F.2d 1537, 1542 (10th Cir. 1991) ("'An act is done inten-
tionally or wilfully if it is done knowingly and voluntarily as distinguished from acciden-
tally; or is done with a bad purpose; or without justifiable excuse.').
185. See, e.g., Campbell v. Price, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1186, 1191-92 (E.D. Ark. 1998) (ex-
empting the parent from liability under the Act by way of both the extension telephone
exception and consent exception). The court accepted vicarious consent as sufficient rea-
son for exemption because it was subject to an objective test, which is the good faith stan-
dard. See id. Although the court found an exemption under both exceptions, it concluded
that a parent acting in good faith for the best interests of a child was a compelling factor to
allow freedom from liability under the Act. See id.
186. Williams v. Williams, 581 N.W.2d 777, 780-81 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998).
187. See id.
188. See id. at 781.
189. Id.
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the Williams court was prepared to use in cases involving Title III.
19
0
Not all courts agree with Williams.' Even though some courts have
chosen not to adopt vicarious consent because of the particular circum-
stances of their cases, they nonetheless find the doctrine to be sound and
appropriate under the right circumstances.'9 For example, the Pollock
court conceived of situations, such as verbal, mental, or physical abuse by
the other parent, which makes the doctrine necessary to protect the wel-
fare of the child.' 93 The Pollock court further stated that this necessity is
heightened for children who are very young, most likely because they
have no means of protecting themselves.'9
The Pollock court, therefore, adopted the vicarious consent doctrine,
allowing vicarious consent in situations where the parent has a good
faith, objectively reasonable basis to believe it is necessary and in the
best interest of the child to consent to the taping of the phone conversa-
tions with the other parent.'9 In Pollock, a case that involved the taping
of a fourteen-year-old girl's conversations with her father, the court de-
clined to limit the application of the doctrine to a certain age because
each child develops differently.'96 Likely, the court hesitated in making a
definitive age for children to consent to taping because it was not willing
to apply vicarious consent under these circumstances; therefore, a de-
termination of a consent age was not needed.
9 7
Courts that agree on a domestic relations exception to Title III em-
brace the vicarious consent doctrine.' 9 They hold that the doctrine is
necessary to provide for the welfare of the child, which is a parent's re-
190. Id.
191. See, e.g., Pollock v. Pollock, 154 F.3d 601, 610 (6th Cir. 1998). Even though the
Pollock court did not use vicarious consent under the facts of that case, they adopted it as
a doctrine that could be used in the future. See id. at 612; see also, e.g., Thompson v. Du-
laney, 838 F. Supp. 1535, 1545 (D. Utah 1993) (disallowing the use of vicarious consent
under these circumstances for factual reasons, not because of disagreement with the doc-
trine).
192. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
193. Pollock, 154 F.3d at 610.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. (emphasizing the problems the doctrine may have in limiting the application
to children of a certain age because children develop emotionally and intellectually at dif-
ferent rates).
197. See id.
198. See, e.g., Campbell v. Price, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1186, 1190 (E.D. Ark. 1998) (finding
the defendant exempt from liability under both the telephone extension exception and the
vicarious consent doctrine); Silas v. Silas, 680 So. 2d 368, 370 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996)
(choosing the vicarious consent doctrine as a better line of reasoning to find a parent ex-
empt from liability under the Act).
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sponsibility. 99 Many courts have begun using the vicarious consent doc-
trine more frequently in recent years.2° The increasing use of the doc-
trine may be explained by the inability of most people, including oppo-
nents to a domestic relations exception, to deny the value of having a
vicarious consent doctrine. °' Therefore, although opponents argue that
the extension telephone exception is a weak basis for allowing wiretap-
ping between family members, vicariously consenting to the taping when
it is in the best interests of the child provides a solid foundation."'
D. Legislating the Family: There is More to the Story than Just Language
and Legislative History
In addition to using legislative history or the language of the statute,
courts often consider various discreet issues. Congress did not intend for
this Act to be an avenue by which children could put their parents in
jail.0  Congress entrusts parents with a right to decide on their children's
behalf in many situations, so consenting to wiretapping of a telephone
conversation seems a natural extension of those parental rights.
2'
However, there is a need to restrict the scope of this power.205 Other-
199. See, e.g., Campbell, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 1191-92; Silas, 680 So. 2d at 371. The law as-
sumes that it is the parent's job to provide for the best interests of the child, and that the
parent will in fact act in the best interests of the child. See Anderman, supra note 6, at
2290-91. Therefore, the doctrine of vicarious consent aids parents in doing their job.
200. See, e.g., Pollock v. Pollock, 154 F.3d 601, 610 (6th Cir. 1998) (adopting the vicari-
ous consent doctrine); Campbell, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 1191 (using vicarious consent to exempt
the parent from liability for wiretapping his child); Silas, 680 So. 2d at 371 (allowing vicari-
ous consent only after meeting the good faith, objectively reasonable test).
201. See, e.g, Pollock, 154 F.3d at 610 (emphasizing that vicarious consent is necessary
to protect children, especially very young children, in cases of verbal, emotional, and sex-
ual abuse).
202. See Niemeyer, supra note 10, at 252 (expressing the clear differences between an
extension phone and a wiretap). Because of these differences, the extension phone is not
as sophisticated an eavesdropping device as a wiretap. See id. Therefore, the Simpson
court's application of the extension telephone exception is flawed. See id.; see also supra
note 201 (describing situations where vicarious consent is necessary).
203. See Leben, supra note 3, at 28 (recognizing the absurdity in suggesting that Con-
gress passed the Act as an avenue for children to incarcerate their parents for wiretapping
their phone conversations).
204. See id. (agreeing that parents generally have the right to make decisions for their
children on many issues); see, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 207, § 7 (West 1994) (re-
quiring parental consent for marriage of persons under age eighteen); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 119, § 55A (West 1994) (requiring parental consent to waive counsel by a minor
in juvenile delinquency hearings).
205. See, e.g., Thompson v. Dulaney, 838 F. Supp. 1535, 1544 (D. Utah 1993) (allowing
vicarious consent only in times when the parent has a good faith, objectively reasonable
belief that it is in the child's best interest). The court notes that this holding does not es-
tablish a "sweeping precedent" of vicarious consent under any circumstances. Id. at 1544
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wise, parents with less than pure motives may be allowed to wiretap with
governmental sanction. 2
Further, as technology increases, it will be both easier and less expen-
sive for parents to wiretap their children's telephone conversations. 7
Considering the rights of parents under current law and technological
advancements, there may be no limit as to how far a parent is allowed to
go in the protection of his or her child . If broad interpretations of Title
III's exceptions continue, some courts may find that videotaping a child,
reading a child's e-mail, and installing locator devices on a child's car are
also acceptable. 09
III. THE FUTURE OF TITLE III-HOW VICARIOUS CONSENT CAN FIND
A WAY
It is obvious that courts are confused as to Congress's intent for Title
111.20 The legislative history of the Act reveals Congress's awareness of
issues of spousal wiretapping falling into the Title III domain.21  Thus, it
appears equally obvious that Congress' silence on the matter, even with
n.8. Rather, the doctrine is allowed under this restricted scope to ensure that a parent will
fulfill his or her statutory duty to act in the best interests of the child. See id. at 1544.
206. See, e.g., Williams v. Williams, 581 N.W.2d 777, 781 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998) (recog-
nizing vicarious consent's many implications, including scenarios where parents with less
than worthy motives could wiretap their children's conversations).
207. See Wiretapping and Eavesdropping: Is There a Cause for Concern (visited Sept.
14, 2000) <http://www.vortex.com/privacy/prc.wire-9.z> (recognizing that technology im-
provements have made wiretapping another person's phone conversations much easier);
see, e.g., Jacqueline L. Salmon, Children Under Surveillance; When Parents' Trust Wears
Out, Some Resort To Spying on Their Teens, WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 1999, at Al (giving
examples of easier ways for parents to spy on their children). Currently, a kit sold online
for $60 can detect the presence of drugs by testing a single lock of hair. See id. Home uri-
nalysis kits and computerized devices to track a car are also available to aid parents' ef-
forts to spy on their children. See id.
208. See, e.g., infra note 209 and accompanying text (discussing the lengths parents will
go to spy on their children using current technology).
209. See, e.g., Ross Werland, The Spies Who Love Me; Do Parents Cross the Line
When They Invade Their Teen's Privacy?, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 28, 1999, at 13-1 (noting that
wiretapping is illegal under federal and state statutes, but video monitoring "falls within a
parent's rights," and describing recent technology that attaches on a car so that the car's
location and how fast it is going can be known). Parents have used these devices to moni-
tor their teen's activities. See id.; see also Salmon, supra note 207, at Al (describing a
mother who, while reading her 14-year-old daughter's e-mail, discovered the daughter
used marijuana).
210. See, e.g., supra note 13 and accompanying text (giving examples of the inconsis-
tent interpretations of Title III in the context of interspousal wiretapping); see also infra
notes 214-15 and accompanying text.
211. See supra note 98 and accompanying text (recognizing that marital litigation is a
large category in which wiretapping is used).
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this awareness, indicates that Congress intended liability under the Act
212for at least some domestic cases.
A. Merits of a Legislative Answer
As such, it is unclear whether parent-child wiretapping was intended
specifically to fall under the purview of the Act.2t 3 Confusion arises from
the myriad of federal and state court interpretations of Title 111. 214 Not
only have the courts contradicted each other, but in the case of the Tenth
Circuit, courts have even been reluctant to follow precedent they set
themselves.1 5 Courts are fumbling the question of liability and the legis-
lature should intervene.2 6 There is no uniform precedent binding the cir-
cuits because the United States Supreme Court has not granted certiorari
on any case that involves parent-child wiretapping. 27 As a result, it only
seems reasonable for Congress to step in and clarify the ambiguity in the
Act.
21 8
Accordingly, if Congress amends Title III, the confusion between the
courts may end. The Williams court claimed that a legislative, rather
than judicial, answer is needed.1 9 The court contended that because the
212. See Anderman, supra note 6, at 2271 (claiming that the language and legislative
history of Title III shows that it was enacted first and foremost to ban all private wiretap-
pings, and allow for exceptions after).
213. See id. at 2273 (noting that courts are left with the extension telephone exception
and consent exception to keep parent-child wiretapping out of the Act's purview).
214. See, e.g., Newcomb v. Ingle, 944 F.2d 1534, 1535 n.3 (10th Cir. 1991) (highlighting
the circuit split on the issue of the existence of a domestic relations exception to Title III).
215. Compare Heggy v. Heggy, 944 F.2d 1537, 1541 (10th Cir. 1991) (claiming that
there is no judicially created exception for interspousal wiretapping as other courts would
suggest), with Newcomb, 944 F.2d at 1536 (finding an exemption of parents from liability
for wiretapping their children through the extension telephone exception). Newcomb was
decided about one month before Heggy. Heggy, 944 F.2d at 1537 (noting date of decision
as Oct. 2, 1991); Newcomb, 944 F.2d at 1534 (noting date of decision as Aug. 28, 1991).
The Heggy court declined to extend the same type of freedom from liability as it had given
in Newcomb. Heggy, 944 F.2d at 1538 n.1.
216. See, e.g., Williams v. Williams, 581 N.W.2d 777, 781 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998) (rec-
ommending a legislative answer over a judicial one, to cure the confusion surrounding Ti-
tle III).
217. Cf. Hohn v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1969, 1978 (1998) (holding that Supreme
Court decisions are binding precedent until either the Supreme Court sees fit to revisit the
same question, regardless of whether future cases raise doubt as to the precedent's valid-
ity).
218. See, e.g., Stephens, supra note 19, at 1052 (claiming that only a positive expression
of congressional intent overcomes the inconclusive legislative history applying Title III to
interspousal wiretapping cases).
219. Williams, 581 N.W.2d at 781 (acknowledging the resources Congress has, in con-
trast to the judiciary, to make changes to the Act in order to serve the competing interests
at stake).
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legislature is able to hold hearings and sort through the competing inter-
ests and policy issues at stake, it is better-suited to address the problem.220
A legislative answer allows for consistency among the courts.221 Lawsuits
222may not end, but the inconsistency between rulings likely would end.
B. Mechanics of Proposed Legislation
In order to draft a legislative answer, certain lines must be drawn to
balance children's privacy rights against a parent's right to protect
them. 2' A legislative response should include a vicarious consent excep-
tion in which a parent can vicariously consent on behalf of his or her
child until the child reaches the consent age.
1. Finding a Consent Age
Thus far, there is no consent age established for children that limits a
parent's right to consent to the taping of their telephone conversations.
Parents, in the eyes of the law, make many decisions for their children.224
For example, minors needing medical treatment or seeking marriage
need the permission of their parents.22' Generally, a parent may consent
220. See id.
221. See, e.g., Niemeyer, supra note 10, at 255 (noting that courts are looking for a
congressional answer to the domestic wiretapping dispute under the Act).
222. Cf ROBERT L. JORDAN & WILLIAM D. WARREN, COMMERCIAL LAW 63 (4th
ed. 1997) (noting that the revision of Article 9 (more specifically §9-503(a)) of the Uni-
form Commercial Code resolved the circuit split, discussed in Pearson v. Salina Coffee
House, Inc., 831 F.2d 1531 (10th Cir. 1987), over use of a trade name). The revisions de-
cided whether a trade name was sufficient for purposes of filing financial statements to
perfect a security interest. See id. An amendment to Title III would also resolve the cir-
cuit split, which is similar to the revision of Article 9.
223. See supra note 37 and accompanying text (discussing the privacy rights of both a
child and adult, and how they often compete against one another); see also infra note 247
and accompanying text (comparing these competing interests).
224. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 637 (1979) (recognizing that states protect
their youth from adverse governmental action and from their lack of maturity by requiring
parental consent to important decisions by minors); see also Leben, supra note 3, at 28; see,
e.g., supra note 204 and accompanying text (giving examples of decisions, such as marriage
of a minor child and waiver of counsel in a juvenile proceeding, that parents make on their
child's behalf).
225. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 207, § 7 (West 1994) (requiring parental
consent for marriage of persons under eighteen); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112 § 12S
(West 1994) (requiring parental consent for girls under the age of eighteen to receive an
abortion); see also, e.g., Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 643 (striking down a Massachusetts statute re-
quiring parental consent in all cases where a minor wanted to have an abortion). The
court, however, replaced this requirement with one in which a minor may seek an abortion
if: (1) she has parental consent; or (2) a court deems the abortion in her best interests or
that she is mature enough to make the decision independently. See id. at 643-44. Minor is
defined as "[a]n infant or person who is under the age of legal competence.... In most
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on behalf of his or her child in the above-named situations until the child
is eighteen years old, the age at which a child is considered a legal
adult.126  To promulgate a vicarious consent exception, Congress first
needs to explore a consent age to properly assess when a child can con-
sent legally to the wiretapping.
Congress should establish age eighteen as the consent age because it is
the only plausible age that can be set."' Reasonably, eighteen is the best
age because this is the age at which the law recognizes that children are
legally capable of making their own decisions as adults.28 If Congress
makes a consent age lower than eighteen, it will likely bring a storm of
controversy and lawsuits because lower ages are inconsistent with many
other laws making the consent age for various activities that of eight-229
een. Consistency in the age of consent will reduce ambiguity and
lessen the need to evaluate subjectively individual children's ability to
consent.2 0
states, a person is no longer a minor after reaching the age of 18 (though state laws may
still prohibit certain acts until reaching a greater age; e.g. purchase of liquor)." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 997 (6th ed. 1990).
226. See Beschle, supra note 36, at 90 (realizing that curfews and minimum drinking
ages are examples of situations where minors are deemed incapable of making their own
decisions). As opposed to a minor, an adult is one who attained the legal age of majority,
generally 18 years. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 51 (6th ed. 1990); see also Stanford v.
Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 374 (1989) (arguing that the laws that set age 18 as the legal age
for activities, such as driving, drinking, and voting, may not represent the age where all
persons are mature enough to handle those responsibilities).
227. See Pollock v. Pollock, 154 F.3d 601, 610 (6th Cir. 1998) (denying to set a consent
age for application of vicarious consent because each child develops differently); see, e.g.,
Stanford, 492 U.S. at 370. As of the ruling in this 1989 case, 37 states permitted capital
punishment. See id. Out of those 37 states, 15 declined to impose capital punishment on
sixteen-year old offenders, and 12 states declined to impose it on seventeen-year old of-
fenders. See id. Such numbers indicate that states cannot agree on an age lower than 18 to
allow capital punishment. Therefore, because a number of people disagree on proper con-
sent ages, as state legislatures do with capital punishment, Congress is unlikely to agree on
a consent age for Title III lower than 18.
228. See, e.g., Stanford, 492 U.S. at 374 (noting the laws, which create the age of par-
ticipation as 18, do not determine maturity, but rather make determinations for the mass
of people these laws protect). The court stated that "[t]hese laws set the appropriate ages
for the operation of a system that makes its determinations in gross, and does not conduct
individualized maturity tests for each driver, drinker, or voter." Id.
229. Cf id. at 370-71 (recognizing that many states differ in opinions on whether a
child less than 18 can be subjected to capital punishment); see also supra note 227 and ac-
companying text (explaining that disagreement will happen if the consent age is lower
than 18, just as there is disagreement between states involving a capital punishment age
lower than 18).
230. See Anderman, supra note 6, at 2290 (defining adult as one who by law has the
authority to decide what is best for oneself without having to consult anybody, including
his or her parents).
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2. Language of a Vicarious Consent Exception
The vicarious consent doctrine is a recent line of reasoning that many
courts use."' Many courts in the past have used the extension telephone
exception to justify parent-child wiretapping under the Act, but it ap-
pears to be an arguable line of reasoning at best.232 The extension tele-
phone exception exempts from liability intercepted communications used
in the ordinary course of business. 233 Assuming arguendo that the exten-
sion telephone exception does apply to the home, there are questions as
to whether wiretapping is expected in the ordinary course of business in
the home.3 This is further evidence that unambiguous language is
needed to clarify the intent of Congress in the statute.
C. Application of the Vicarious Consent Exception
There is no doubt that the vicarious consent doctrine has virtuous mo-
tives. 23' Few people can deny that a child has a right to be protected from
abuse, and that the best person to provide that protection is usually a
parent. 36 The absence of a vicarious consent doctrine could endanger
children whose needs for protection would go unmet without it."' A
parent may never be able to learn the truth about the other parent's rela-
231. See, e.g., Scheib v. Grant, 22 F.3d 149, 154 (7th Cir. 1994); Campbell v. Price, 2 F.
Supp. 2d 1186, 1190 (E.D. Ark. 1998); Silas v. Silas, 680 So. 2d 368, 371 (Ala. Civ. App.
1996).
232. See Stephens, supra note 19, at 1047 (recognizing the split in the courts over in-
terpretation of the extension telephone exception). Some courts permit this exception to
invade the private home to exempt liability, while others do not. See id. at 1047-48. The
legislative history raises only questionable support for applying Title III to interspousal
wiretapping, which makes the possible outcomes for a court decision uncertain. See id. at
1049-50.
233. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5)(a) (1994); Leben, supra note 3, at 26 (recognizing that the
Act exempts liability for those telephone interceptions that occur to a telephone company
subscriber when used in the ordinary course of business).
234. See Anderman, supra note 6, at 2275 (assuming that the extension telephone ex-
ception applies to home telephones; noting, however, that the ordinary course of business
for a commercial business is different than the ordinary course of business in a home).
235. See, e.g., Thompson v. Dulaney, 838 F. Supp. 1535, 1544 (C.D. Utah 1993) (recog-
nizing situations such as mental, physical or emotional abuse in which it is necessary for
parents to consent on behalf of their children).
236. See Anderman, supra note 6, at 2290-91 (presuming that a parent has, by law, the
ability to determine what is best for the child); see also supra note 37 and accompanying
text (describing the competing rights at stake for both children and adults in these situa-
tions).
237. See, e.g., Pollock v. Pollock, 154 F.3d 601, 610 (6th Cir. 1998) (stressing the impor-
tance of vicarious consent to protect the child's welfare, especially young children, in cases
of abuse).
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tionship with the child unless a vicarious consent exception exists.238
There may be no other available means to receiving the same type of in-
formation about the other parent than by taping his or her phone conver-
sations with the child.23 9 Leaving the parent in this hopeless position
could allow for both psychological and physical damage to the child, as
one parent cannot find out the true nature of the other parent's relation-
ship with the child.
This does not mean, however, that Congress should allow parents the
unfettered power to take whatever actions may be necessary to find out
about the relationship between the child and the other parent.240 There
needs to be some standard to protect a child's right of privacy, as well as
a parent's right to protect his or her child. 241 This standard needs to be
established especially in the context of vicarious consent cases.
Generally, divorce produces harsh feelings between the parties.4 2 This
may prompt one parent to wiretap the other parent's conversations with
the child in order to appear better-suited to handle custody of the child
in the eyes of the court.243 An objective good faith basis is necessary to
keep a parent's motives for wiretapping limited to the best interests of
the child.244
For example, the Pollock court seemed to take into consideration the
238. See, e.g., Gottsfield, supra note 7, at 33 (declaring that intercepted tape recordings
of a child's conversations with a parent may be the best evidence in determining the na-
ture of the relationship between the child and parent).
239. Cf Salmon, supra note 207, at Al (quoting a parent as saying "I had to do what-
ever I had to do" in reference to taping his or her child's calls to determine if the child was
using drugs).
240. But see Gottsfield, supra note 7, at 33 (giving reasons why a parent may feel it
necessary to tape the child's conversations in order to best protect them). These reasons
include "a history of domestic violence, mental instability, repeated efforts to undermine
the taping parent's or counselor's relationship with the children, pattern of emotional and
psychological abuse of the children, [or] a reasonable fear for the safety of the children."
Id.
241. See, e.g., Anderman, supra note 6, at 2307 (noting that it may not be beneficial to
raise the competing interests of a parent and child against each other); see also supra note
37 and accompanying text (noting the competing interests).
242. See Lou Gonzales, The Bitter Aftermath: Anger and Resentment Overcome Di-
vorced Couples' Friendly Intentions, KAN. CITY STAR, Sept. 26, 1999, at G3 (giving exam-
ples such as name calling, sabotage, game-playing, and even violence as products that of-
ten result from divorce).
243. See generally Zuber, supra note 20, at 455 (noting that a motivation behind
spousal wiretapping is to defeat the virtuous appearance in court of one spouse over the
other).
244. See Thompson v. Dulaney, 838 F. Supp. 1535, 1544 (D. Utah 1993) (directing that
vicarious consent is permissible so that a parent may fulfill his or her statutory require-
ment to act in the best interests of his or her child).
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privacy rights of all parties involved when it invoked a good faith, objec-
tively reasonable requirement to limit when a parent may tape another
parent's telephone conversations with his or her child.245 This good faith,
objectively reasonable test should be incorporated into the Act; however,
the legislature needs to qualify the test further in order to properly en-
sure that the rights of all concerned parties are protected.
A test that allows for wiretapping by a parent when the parent has a
good faith, objectively reasonable belief that the child is being physically,
mentally, or sexually abused by the other parent may be the answer.246
This qualifies the statute to specific circumstances in which a parent may
wiretap, while also respecting the rights of the other parties.47 Included
in this test should be a requirement that the parent who is wiretapping
produce evidence that the child displayed signs of abuse caused by the
other parent prior to the wiretapping.2 48 This requirement would further
prove a good faith, objectively reasonable motive by the parent in wire-
tapping the conversations, and ensure that parents are wiretapping for
a worthy reason specifically related to the child.20 Although this solution
245. Pollock v. Pollock, 154 F.3d 601, 610 (6th Cir. 1998).
246. See id. (conceiving of situations such as mental, physical, or sexual abuse by the
other parent that make vicarious consent necessary for the welfare of the child).
247. Cf Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712-13 (1976) (recognizing a right of privacy for
adults through the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution). Compare Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851
(1992) (acknowledging the constitutional protection parents have in making personal deci-
sions regarding child rearing, family relationships, and other parental concerns), with Dea-
ton v. Delta Democrat Publishing Co., 326 So. 2d 471, 474 (Miss. 1976) (disallowing the
names and pictures of children who attended a school for the mentally retarded to be
published because publication violated the children's right to privacy). The proposed test
for vicarious consent balances the rights of a parent in child rearing against the rights of
privacy of the child and the parent being wiretapped.
248. See, e.g., Campbell v. Price, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1186, 1191 (E.D. Ark. 1998). The facts
of Campbell indicate that the father witnessed several instances in which the child would
cry, become upset, and mope around after talking on the phone with her mother. Id. at
1187. This evidence was sufficient for the court to find a good faith, objectively reasonable
belief by the father to wiretap the child's telephone conversations. See id. at 1191.
249. But see Thompson, 838 F. Supp. at 1544 & n.8 (stressing the court's unwillingness
to use vicarious consent in all circumstances). However, the court noted that the mother
needs to meet the good faith, objectively reasonable test of vicarious consent, before they
would exempt her from liability. See id. at 1544. Even though there were two minor chil-
dren involved and the father was undermining the guardian/mother, making it permissible
to use the doctrine, she was found not exempt on other grounds. See id. at 1544 & n.8.
250. See, e.g., Silas v. Silas, 680 So. 2d 368, 371 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996) (using the rea-
soning in Thompson and R.J.D. v. Vaughan Clinic, P.C., 572 So. 2d 1225, 1227 (Ala. 1990),
to exempt a parent from liability through the vicarious consent defense). The Silas court
found the facts similar to that in Thompson, so as to allow the vicarious consent defense.
Silas, 680 So. 2d at 371. As in Vaughan Clinic, Silas agreed that a parent decides what is
necessary for the welfare of a child. Id. Therefore, the good faith, objectively reasonable
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would result in more Congressional intervention in the private lives of
citizens, intervention to prevent abuse of children by their parents, how-
ever, is necessary."'
With regard to the interspousal exception under the Act, the language
of Title III clearly covers interspousal wiretapping.252 Although courts
have twisted the words of the legislative history to find an interspousal
exception, the language of Title III does not specifically permit one.253 In
order to cure the confusion over interspousal wiretapping, Congress must
go no further but to state that the language of Title III stands.
As has been noted, parent-child wiretapping is much different. 4 It re-
quires a much more complicated solution because the parties involved
are minors.255 The law affords minors special protection because they are
not capable of protecting themselves.256 If Congress implemented a vi-
carious consent exception and a good faith, objectively reasonable test, it
would ensure the adequate protection of children under the law, and
prevent the arbitrary violation of parent's privacy rights.
VI. CONCLUSION
There is no specific domestic relations exception under the Act that
exempts interspousal wiretapping and parent-child wiretapping. How-
ever, some courts find a domestic relations exception to exist by using
the legislative history of the Act. Conversely, other courts follow the ex-
plicit language of the Act to find no domestic relations exception to exist.
The division between courts on domestic relations cases of wiretapping
is extensive. This division may never be reconciled unless Congress steps
in to clarify. Congress needs to intervene in order for courts to make
consistent rulings. Acceptance of a vicarious consent exception and a
requirement for the vicarious consent ensures a parent is keeping the welfare of the child
in mind. See id.
251. See, e.g., Pollock, 154 F.3d at 610 (refusing to use vicarious consent under the pre-
sent circumstances, but realizing that situations such as emotional, verbal, or sexual abuse
is where the doctrine of vicarious consent would be necessary).
252. But see Stephens, supra note 19, at 1052 (claiming that Title III would apply to
interspousal wiretapping if the presumption that federal law does not apply to domestic
relations cases could be overcome).
253. See Niemeyer, supra note 10, at 238-39.
254. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text (noting the delicate nature of the
parent-child relationship as a reason why the analysis for parental liability under Title III
is different from other forms such as interspousal liability).
255. See Anderman, supra note 6, at 2308 (admitting that special protection is required
because the parties involved in Title III cases are sometimes children who lack legal ca-
pacity).
256. See Gottsfield, supra note 7, at 33 (showing that vicarious consent is grounded in
the principle of protection for the child who lacks legal capacity to consent).
[Vol. 50:429
2001] Parent-Child Wiretapping: Is Title III Enough? 465
good faith, objectively reasonable standard would protect a child's best
interests. This test, however, should be limited. Congress should exempt
a parent from liability under the Act only when the parent has a good
faith, objectively reasonable belief that the child is being mentally, physi-
cally, or sexually abused by the other parent. Furthermore, the parent
should be required to produce evidence that the child displayed signs of
abuse before the parent began wiretapping.
By adopting this test, the confusion between decisions in the circuit
and state courts would lessen. The test limits the scope in which a parent
may vicariously consent, but still protects the best interests of the child
while upholding the protection rights of parents. This solution provides a
win-win situation for all so that children are afforded the privacy they de-
serve and parents maintain their right to protect their child.
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